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This dissertation contains three essays on vulnerable 
workers—workers who have recently experienced a shock 
that could adversely affect their labor market prospects. Each 
chapter explores the mechanisms behind vulnerable workers’ 
earnings losses and the role of public policy in mitigating 
these losses. I identify important factors in workers’ labor 
market success, shedding light on the earnings determination 
process. With a better understanding of relevant factors, I 
assess whether state programs are allocating resources to the 
most vulnerable workers.
In the first essay, I study displaced workers—those who 
have lost their job as a result of a firm or plant closing. On 
average, displaced workers experience large, long-lasting 
earnings losses, but some displaced workers experience 
larger earnings changes after displacement than others. I use 
comprehensive occupational employment data to estimate 
the effect of the state-level occupation growth rate in the 
worker’s predisplacement occupation on subsequent labor 
market outcomes. I find that adverse labor market condi-
tions in a worker’s occupation at the time of displacement 
have negative consequences. Displacement from a shrink-
ing occupation is associated with decreased earnings and 
longer durations of joblessness. Furthermore, holding the 
occupation growth rate constant, there is only a small effect 
of the worker’s industry growth rate on their labor market 
outcomes. These results suggest that vulnerable displaced 
workers’ difficulties in the labor market are a function of 
their skills and less related to the goods and services they 
were previously producing. The workers at greatest risk have 
occupation-specific human capital that is less valuable after 
their job loss, leading to either longer durations of jobless-
ness or larger earnings losses.
Displaced workers are not the only workers who experi-
ence sizable and persistent earnings losses. More recently, 
researchers have found a similar profile of losses among 
mothers after the birth of their first child. It appears job dis-
placement is not the only major life event with labor market 
consequences. The second essay investigates the effect of 
additional benefits on mothers who have new family respon-
sibilities in California’s Paid Family Leave program.
Specifically, with my coauthors Kelly Bedard and Maya 
Rossin-Slater, I use 10 years of California administrative 
data with a regression kink design to estimate the causal 
impacts of benefits in the first state-level paid family leave 
(PFL) program for women with earnings near the maximum 
benefit threshold. We find no evidence that a higher weekly 
benefit amount increases leave duration or leads to adverse 
future labor market outcomes for this group. In contrast, we 
document that a rise in the weekly benefit amount leads to an 
increased likelihood of returning to the pre-leave firm (condi-
tional on any employment) and of making a subsequent PFL 
claim.
The PFL program in California falls under the larger 
umbrella of state Disability Insurance (DI), both of which 
have become important sources of social insurance, with 
benefit payments now exceeding those of the state’s Unem-
ployment Insurance program. However, there is consider-
able inequality in program take-up. While existing research 
shows that firm-specific factors explain a significant part of 
the growing earnings inequality in the United States, little 
is known about the role of firms in determining the use of 
public leave-taking benefits.
In the third essay, using administrative data from Califor-
nia with my coauthors Kelly Bedard, Maya Rossin-Slater, 
and Jenna Stearns, I find strong evidence that DI and PFL 
program take-up is substantially higher in firms with high 
earnings premiums. A one standard deviation increase in the 
firm premium is associated with a 57 percent higher claim 
rate incidence. Put differently, take-up of temporary social 
insurance programs is lower in lower earnings premium 
firms. Workers at these firms, therefore, are more vulnerable 
from both an earnings perspective and a benefits perspec-
tive. Our results suggest that changes in firm behavior have 
the potential to impact social insurance use and thus reduce 
an important dimension of inequality in America. Despite 
near-universal program eligibility for workers, non-policy- 
driven determinants of take-up play a major role.
Identifying Vulnerable Displaced Workers:  
The Role of State-Level Occupation Conditions
Displaced workers, those who lose their job as a result of 
a firm or plant closing, have large earnings losses on aver-
age. However, these large average losses mask substantial 
variation across workers. What explains this variation? Prior 
research shows that workers displaced when the national 
unemployment rate is high experience larger earnings losses 
than those displaced when the national unemployment rate is 
low. But the national unemployment rate may mask substan-
tial differences between workers in their labor market pros-
pects. Specifically, a worker may have more or less difficulty 
finding work depending on conditions in their occupation, 
defined as the set of activities or tasks they are paid to per-
form, or their industry, defined as the primary business activ-
ity of their establishment. The roles of these predisplacement 
employment attributes may shed light on the circumstances 
under which a worker’s human capital may be less valuable. 
This distinction is also important to effectively target job 
search assistance to recently unemployed workers.
Attempts to perform such an analysis have been con-
strained by data limitations. Specifically, because occupation 
is a worker-level characteristic with many options, annual 
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occupational employment estimates to measure short-term 
employment fluctuations do not exist in the United States. 
I address this limitation by constructing a novel measure of 
occupation conditions that captures short-term, state-level 
fluctuations in occupational employment by combining exist-
ing data sets on the share of each occupation in an industry 
and industry growth rates.
Then, using data from the Current Population Survey Dis-
placed Worker Supplement, I study the effects of poor state 
labor market conditions in a displaced worker’s occupation 
of origin on a number of labor market outcomes. In models 
comparing workers displaced from different occupations in 
the same state and year net of occupation fixed effects, those 
displaced from shrinking occupations suffer significantly lon-
ger durations of joblessness and lower earnings, conditional 
on being reemployed. A one standard deviation decrease 
in the worker’s occupation growth rate (which is approxi-
mately 4 percentage points) is associated with a 16.1 percent 
increase in the duration of joblessness and a 9.2 percent 
decrease in weekly earnings. Additionally, I find that state-
level occupation growth impacts durations of joblessness 
significantly more than state-level industry growth does. The 
estimated effect of the industry growth rate also diminishes 
in all models, including the occupation growth rate. This 
supports the claim that employment prospects depend much 
more on workers’ occupation (the set of activities or tasks 
that employees are paid to perform) than their industry (the 
primary business activity of their establishment).
The idea that state-level occupation conditions matter is 
quite intuitive, but their importance has not been measured 
because of data limitations. Unlike industry codes, which 
employers report when submitting information for unem-
ployment insurance, regularly produced comprehensive 
occupational employment data are only available from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Occupational Employment 
Statistics program and suffer from a significant limitation. 
The data used to produce occupation employment estimates 
for each year are collected in a three-year sampling cycle, 
which means independent annual occupation employment 
estimates are not produced. As a result, existing estimates 
cannot capture short-term fluctuations in occupational 
employment. I address this limitation by constructing an 
occupation growth rate measure using a shift-share method 
based on states’ different occupation and industry composi-
tions and national industry growth rates. This measure of the 
occupation growth rate takes into account the growth of all 
industries that employ workers in a particular occupation in 
the state to assess potential employment opportunities within 
a displaced worker’s occupation.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to cre-
ate a measure of local conditions within an occupation and to 
estimate its importance for displaced workers’ labor market 
outcomes. This new evidence that the relevant employment 
conditions are at the occupation level suggests a significant 
role for occupation-specific human capital relative to  
industry-specific human capital. In contrast to workers dis-
placed from shrinking industries, there appears to be consid-
erably less scope for workers from shrinking occupations to 
find work with similar earnings.
This research builds on literature on specific human 
capital, which shows that displaced workers who change 
occupations, or skill portfolios, lose more than displaced 
workers who change industries (Kambourov and Manovskii 
2009; Poletaev and Robinson 2008). However, the decision 
to change occupations or industries is endogenous, making it 
difficult to attach a causal interpretation to these differences. 
By identifying the occupation growth rate, an observable 
factor associated with costly switching, I demonstrate a clear 
relationship between decreased demand for occupational 
services and its labor market consequences.
In addition, because industry- and occupation-switching 
are outcomes of the postdisplacement job search process, the 
act of switching cannot be used to target reemployment assis-
tance to displaced workers. In this way, this paper contrib-
utes to the literature on targeting workers who are likely to 
experience longer unemployment durations or large earnings 
losses, while speaking to the efficacy of certain reemploy-
ment policies in the United States. For example, this paper 
suggests that policies targeted at declining industries are 
poorly focused because displaced workers’ difficulties are 
more related to their skills than the goods and services they 
were producing.
The effect of the occupation growth rate on displaced 
workers’ labor market outcomes in this paper complements 
existing research on the effects of adverse labor market 
conditions on various groups, including displaced workers 
(Davis and von Wachter 2011), economists (Oyer 2006)  
and college graduates (Altonji, Kahn, and Speer 2016;  
Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz 2012). In fact, the 
magnitude of the main estimate in this paper (a 9.2 percent 
decrease in weekly earnings per standard deviation decrease 
in occupation growth rate) is similar to the short-run effects 
of graduating during a typical recession found in Oreopoulos, 
von Wachter, and Heisz (2012) and Altonji, Kahn, and Speer 
(2016). As this effect is strongest for the contemporaneous 
occupation growth rate and not the occupation growth rate in 
the prior year or two years ago, it appears that this loss can 
be attributed to temporary adverse labor market conditions. 
That said, unlike economy-wide recessions, the types of 
shocks examined here depend also on workers’ state of resi-
dence and occupation. They are also net of controls for year 
of displacement, state of residence, and minor occupation 
group, and therefore demonstrate the impact of conditions 
even more localized to the worker. As workers’ employment 
prospects are dependent on conditions at the state and occu-
pation level, aggregate indicators like the national unemploy-
ment rate mask the heterogeneity in employment prospects 
within occupations, across states, and over time.
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Finally, this paper contributes to a long line of literature 
interested in understanding displaced workers’ labor mar-
ket outcomes. It relates most closely to Carrington (1993), 
who argued that the wage losses of high-tenured displaced 
workers can be attributed to downturns in industry, occupa-
tion, and state labor market conditions. The major insight of 
Carrington’s paper, echoed by Neal (1995), is that workers 
displaced from declining industries experienced significantly 
greater wage losses than workers displaced from growing 
industries. Based on the data available at the time, the Car-
rington study uses only 10 occupation categories, admitting 
that this grouping is coarse, while the industry employment 
measures are finer. As a result of these data limitations, 
relevant employment growth at the industry level was much 
better measured than relevant employment growth at the 
occupation level, which suggested a strong role of industry 
conditions and, potentially, industry-specific human capital.
With better data and a new method to identify an occupa-
tion growth rate, I find that occupation growth has a signifi-
cantly larger role than industry growth in determining dura-
tions of joblessness, and has a significant relationship with 
earnings changes, holding constant the industry growth rate. 
This information is valuable for state workforce agencies, 
who, since the Unemployment Compensation Amendments 
of 1993, have been mandated to target job search assistance 
to workers most likely to exhaust their unemployment insur-
ance. By and large, however, our current social insurance 
system is more likely to target using industry or industry 
conditions than occupation or occupation conditions (Dick-
inson, Kreutzer, and Decker 1997). In fact, not all states even 
collect the occupation of unemployment insurance claimants. 
As new technology has the potential to fundamentally affect 
the labor market and it appears that workers of different 
occupations will be affected differently (Brynjolfsson, Mitch-
ell, and Rock 2018), this information may be increasingly 
useful in improving the provision of scarce resources for 
reemployment assistance, based on information available to 
the states at the time of displacement.
The Impact of Paid Family Leave Benefits: 
Regression Kink Evidence from California 
Administrative Data
(with Kelly Bedard and Maya Rossin-Slater)
A vast body of research has documented a persistent 
“motherhood wage penalty” that can last 10 to 20 years after 
childbirth. Mothers earn lower wages, work fewer hours, 
and are less likely to be employed than fathers or childless 
women and men (see, e.g., Kleven, Landais, and Søgaard 
[2018] and Kleven et al. [2019], among others), and these 
differences are particularly pronounced for highly educated 
women at the top of the female earnings distribution  
(Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2002; Bertrand, Goldin,  
and Katz 2010; Chung et al. 2017; Hotchkiss, Pitts, and 
Walker 2017). Paid family leave (PFL)—a policy that allows 
working mothers to take time off work to recover from child-
birth and care for their newborn (or newly adopted) children 
while receiving partial wage replacement—may be a tool 
for reducing this penalty if it facilitates career continuity 
and advancement for women. However, opponents of PFL 
caution that it could have the opposite effect: by allowing 
mothers to have paid time away from work, PFL may lower 
their future labor market attachment, while employers could 
face substantial costs that lead to increased discrimination 
against women. These discussions are especially fervent in 
the United States, which is the only developed country with-
out a national paid maternity or family leave policy.
We use administrative data from California—the first 
state to implement a PFL program—and use a regression 
kink (RK) design to identify the effects of the benefit amount 
on leave duration, labor market outcomes, and subsequent 
leave-taking among high-earning mothers. Isolating the 
effect of the benefit amount is critical for informing debates 
about payment during leave. Since the vast majority of 
U.S. workers already have access to unpaid leave through 
their employers and the federal Family and Medical Leave 
Act, the wage replacement rate is arguably the most salient 
parameter under debate. A long literature on other social 
insurance programs finds a positive relationship between 
the benefit amount and program participation duration, with 
elasticities ranging between 0.3 and 2 in the case of UI (Card 
et al 2015). As such, a higher PFL benefit may increase 
maternity leave duration, which could in turn adversely affect 
women’s subsequent labor market trajectories.
To identify the causal effect of benefits, we make use of 
a kink in the PFL benefit schedule in California: during our 
analysis time frame, participants get 55 percent of their prior 
earnings replaced, up to a maximum benefit amount. Intui-
tively, we compare the outcomes of mothers with pre-leave 
earnings just below and just above the threshold at which the 
maximum benefit applies. These women have similar observ-
able characteristics but face dramatically different marginal 
wage replacement rates of 55 and 0 percent, respectively. 
The RK method identifies the causal effect of the benefit 
amount by testing for a change in the slope of the relation-
ship between an outcome and preclaim earnings at the same 
threshold (Card et al. 2016).
While a key advantage of the RK method is that it can 
account for the endogeneity in the benefit amount, the 
primary limitation is that the RK sample is not representa-
tive of the population of leave-takers. The kink is located 
around the 92nd percentile of the California female earnings 
distribution, and women in the vicinity of the kink point 
are older and work in larger firms than the average female 
program participant. That being said, high-earning women’s 
careers may be especially sensitive to employment inter-
ruptions (Hotchkiss, Pitts, and Walker 2017; Stearns 2016). 
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Additionally, RK estimates provide information about the 
implications of benefit changes around the maximum benefit 
threshold. These are highly policy relevant because all exist-
ing state PFL programs, as well as the current national PFL 
proposal (the Family and Medical Insurance Leave Act, or 
FAMILY Act), feature similar kinked benefit schedules but 
have different kink point locations.
Our results show that higher benefits do not increase 
maternity leave duration among women with earnings near 
the maximum benefit threshold. Our RK estimates allow us 
to rule out that a 10 percent increase in the weekly benefit 
amount would increase leave duration by more than 0.3 to 
2.1 percent (i.e., we can reject elasticities higher than 0.03 to 
0.21), depending on the specification. Our results underscore 
the notion that PFL provides a distinct type of social insur-
ance and targets a unique population of parents and care-
givers, making the (much larger) elasticities from the prior 
social insurance literature less relevant for PFL (Krueger and 
Meyer 2002).
We also find no evidence that PFL benefits have any 
adverse consequences on subsequent maternal labor market 
outcomes for high-earning women in our sample. A higher 
benefit amount does not have a significant effect on the like-
lihood of returning to employment following the end of the 
leave. However, conditional on returning to work, we find 
that women who receive a higher benefit during leave are 
more likely to return to their pre-leave employers rather than 
find new jobs: a 10 percent increase in the weekly benefit 
amount raises the likelihood of return to the pre-leave firm 
(conditional on any employment) by 0.3 to 4.2 percentage 
points (0.3 to 5 percent), depending on specification. While 
our data do not allow us to observe the exact mechanisms 
underlying this result, it is possible that higher benefits 
during leave improve worker morale or promote firm loyalty 
(even if she recognizes that her employer is not paying her 
benefits directly), similar in spirit to efficiency wage models 
(Akerlof 1984; Katz 1986; Krueger and Summers 1988; 
Stiglitz 1986).
Unequal Use of Social Insurance: The Role  
of Employers
(with Kelly Bedard, Maya Rossin-Slater, and Jenna Stearns)
The dramatic rise in U.S. inequality in recent decades has 
motivated a burgeoning literature on its causes and conse-
quences along a number of dimensions, including wages, 
income, wealth, health, and family structure. When it comes 
to the growth in earnings inequality, recent research empha-
sizes the role of employers, finding that most of the increase 
is due to widening earnings dispersion between, rather than 
within, firms (Song et al. 2018). But less is known about the 
influence of employers on other aspects of inequality among 
Americans, or about nonwage differences between high- 
paying and low-paying firms. In this paper, we aim to 
understand how firms contribute to inequality in the use of 
public short-term leave-taking social insurance programs, 
which allow individuals to take partially paid leave for their 
own medical issues or to care for new children or ill family 
members.
A growing body of evidence demonstrates that access to 
temporary social insurance has beneficial labor market and 
health effects on workers and their families (e.g., Rossin- 
Slater 2018), and can even generate positive externalities for 
the broader population (Stearns and White 2018). However, 
the availability of short-term DI and PFL is highly limited in 
the United States. There is no federal legislation, and only 
five states have implemented public programs. Most firms 
do not provide their own private benefits either, or if they do, 
they do not necessarily offer them to all of their employees 
(Kurani et al. 2017).
In addition to being limited, the use of short-term social 
insurance in the United States is highly unequal. Even in 
California, with almost universal eligibility of workers, DI 
and PFL take-up rates are still substantially different across 
industries, firm sizes, and earnings quartiles for both men 
and women (Bana, Bedard, and Rossin-Slater 2018). As  
most workers learn about public social insurance benefits 
through their employers, and polls document that lack of 
awareness about these programs is a major barrier to take-up 
(DiCamillo and Field 2015), insights into the relationship 
between firm characteristics and program use are critical for 
understanding the drivers of these disparities.
This paper uses 10 years of administrative data from 
California to provide the first evidence on the role of firms 
in explaining differences in short-term social insurance 
take- up. Drawing on a well-established literature that 
demonstrates that observably similar firms pay observably 
similar workers different wages (i.e., employer-specific wage 
premiums, or firm fixed effects) (see, e.g., Abowd, Kramarz, 
and Margolis 1999; Card, Heining, and Kline 2013, Card, 
Cardosa, and Klein 2016; Song et al. 2018), we analyze the 
relationship between the employer earnings premium and the 
share of employees within a firm who take DI or PFL in any 
given year. Whether firms with higher earnings premiums 
are more or less conducive to benefit take-up is theoretically 
ambiguous. Workers at higher premium firms might face a 
higher opportunity cost of taking leave, or be more likely to 
have access to private DI or PFL benefits that could crowd 
out the use of public programs. But employers that offer 
private benefits may have a particularly strong incentive to 
encourage public benefit take-up, as it can lower the cost to 
the firm. Higher earnings premium firms—which are likely 
to be more innovative and productive than their lower- 
premium counterparts (Barth et al. 2016; Faggio, Salvanes, 
and Van Reenen 2010; Van Reenen 1996)—may also view 
their wage-setting policies as complements to creating a 
workplace culture conducive to leave-taking.
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To answer this question, we combine two data sets from 
the California Employment Development Department: the 
universe of DI and PFL claims over fiscal years 2004–2013, 
and quarterly earnings data for nearly all California employ-
ees from 2000 to 2014. Our empirical strategy involves two 
main steps. First, we estimate employer earnings premiums 
using the seminal Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) 
methodology that includes both worker and firm fixed effects 
to account for nonrandom sorting of workers across firms. 
Second, we aggregate the data to an employer-level panel 
and estimate Poisson regressions of the number of social 
insurance claims within a firm in a given year on the firm 
earnings premium, controlling for firm size, industry, and 
year fixed effects, and the percentage of female employees in 
each industry year.
We find strong evidence that public temporary social 
insurance program take-up is higher in firms with relatively 
higher earnings premiums. A one standard deviation increase 
in the firm earnings premium is associated with a 57 percent 
increase in the incidence rate of claims. The effect of the firm 
premium is similar for claims made by men and women, and 
exists for both DI and PFL. We also show that the effect is 
largest for workers in the lower half of the employer-specific 
earnings distribution, suggesting that a firm’s premium is 
particularly important in determining the nonwage benefit 
use of its lowest-earning employees. Although high-premium 
firms have higher claim rates relative to low-premium firms, 
they also have lower average leave durations and higher 
employee retention rates following periods of leave.
The results indicate that characteristics of firm culture 
that are reflected in the firm earnings premium may be key to 
increasing take-up rates of public social insurance in Califor-
nia. If all firms behaved as those in the top third of the firm 
premium distribution, a back-of-the-envelope calculation 
suggests that take-up rates for DI and PFL would increase by 
25 and 29 percent, respectively. By contrast, prior research 
demonstrates that specific policy levers—such as the wage 
replacement rate—have limited effects on take- up (Asai 
2015; Ziebarth 2013; Ziebarth and Karlsson 2010).
Our paper contributes to a growing literature on the deter-
minants of public short-term leave take-up. We know little 
about non-policy-driven determinants of temporary social 
insurance take-up. Research on the importance of workplace 
culture in promoting work-family balance often relies on 
case studies and small samples, and cannot shed light on 
the characteristics of firms that support benefit take-up on a 
broader scale (Clark 2001; Kelly, Moen, and Tranby 2011; 
Moen et al. 2016). A separate literature on firm-specific 
premiums has quantified their importance in driving wage 
inequality (Card, Cardosa, and Klein 2016; Card, Heining, 
and Kline 2013; Song et al. 2018), but less is known about 
nonwage differences between high-premium and low- 
premium firms. This paper bridges this gap by documenting 
a strong and robust association between employer earnings 
premiums and the use of temporary paid leave. Our findings 
suggest that firm-specific factors not only explain a substan-
tial part of earnings dispersion, but also drive disparities in 
the use of public social insurance benefits.
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